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Between Emancipation and Domination: 
Habermasian Reflections on the Empowerment and 
Disempowerment of the Human Subject
SIMON SUSEN
Introduction
The  central  objective  of  Habermas’s  ‘linguistic  turn’ is  to  provide  a 
normative  foundation  for  critical  theory.1 The  main  reason  for  this 
1 See, for example, J. Habermas,  The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1:  
Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1987 [1981]), hereafter TCA I, pp. xli and xliv. See also J. Habermas, On the 
Pragmatics  of  Social  Interaction:  Preliminary  Studies  in  the  Theory  of  
Communicative Action, trans. B. Fultner (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001 [1984]), 
pp. 36 and 102-103.
Habermas’s  aim to  provide  normative  foundations  for  critical  theory  has  been 
thoroughly discussed in the secondary literature. See, for example: R. J. Antonio, 
‘The  Normative  Foundations  of  Emancipatory  Theory:  Evolutionary  versus 
Pragmatic Perspectives’,  American Journal of Sociology  94(4), (1989), pp. 721-
748,  here  pp.  722  and  726-730;  J.  Bengoa  Ruiz  de  Azúa,  De  Heidegger  a 
Habermas. Hermenéutica y fundamentación última en la filosofía contemporánea, 
2a edición (Barcelona: Herder, 2002 [1992]), pp. 127-128; C. Bouchindhomme, 
‘La théorie critique : théorie ? critique ?’, in C. Bouchindhomme and R. Rochlitz, 
eds., Habermas, la raison, la critique (Paris: Cerf, 1996), pp. 139-151, here p. 149; 
M.  Cooke,  ‘Avoiding  Authoritarianism:  On  the  Problem  of  Justification  in 
Contemporary  Critical  Social  Theory’,  International  Journal  of  Philosophical  
Studies 13(3), (2005), pp. 379-404, here pp. 392 and 398; T. Couture ‘Habermas, 
Values, and the Rational, Internal Structure of Communication’,  The Journal of  
Value  Inquiry  27(3-4),  (1993),  pp.  403-416,  here  pp.  404-405;  A.  Créau, 
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undertaking is  the  conviction  that  any social  theory  that  claims  to  be 
committed  to  the  emancipation  of  the  human  condition  needs  to 
demonstrate on what grounds both its critique of social domination and 
its pursuit of social liberation can be justified. Just as Habermas’s belief 
in the necessity and possibility of human emancipation is epitomised in 
the  concept  of  the  ‘ideal  speech  situation’2,  his  acknowledgment  of 
human  domination  cannot  be  dissociated  from  the  concept  of 
Kommunikative  Vernunft  als  "entmystifiziertes  Schicksal" (Frankfurt  am  Main: 
Anton Hain, 1991), pp. 31, 136-137, and 149; W. Detel, ‘System und Lebenswelt 
bei Habermas’, in S. Müller-Doohm, ed.,  Das Interesse der Vernunft: Rückblicke 
auf das Werk von Jürgen Habermas seit "Erkenntnis und Interesse" (Frankfurt am 
Main:  Suhrkamp,  2000),  pp.  175-197,  here  p.  176;  B.  Fultner,  ‘Translator's 
Introduction’, in Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary 
Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action, pp. vii-xxiv, here pp. vii, ix-x, xv-
xvi,  and  xxii;  A.  Honneth,  ‘La  dynamique  sociale  du  mépris.  D'où  parle  une 
théorie  critique  de  la  société  ?’,  in  C.  Bouchindhomme and R.  Rochlitz,  eds., 
Habermas, la raison, la critique (Paris: Cerf, 1996), pp. 215-238, here, pp. 225 and 
237;  N.  Kompridis,  ‘Rethinking  Critical  Theory’,  International  Journal  of  
Philosophical Studies  13(3), (2005), pp. 299-301, here p. 299; T. McCarthy,  The 
Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), p. 415; 
S.  Müller-Doohm,  ‘Kritik  in  kritischen Theorien.  Oder:  Wie  kritisches  Denken 
selber  zu rechtfertigen sei’,  in  Müller-Doohm, ed.,  Das Interesse der  Vernunft:  
Rückblicke auf das Werk von Jürgen Habermas seit "Erkenntnis und Interesse", pp. 
71-106, here pp. 72-73 and 83-100; M. Papastephanou, ‘Communicative Action 
and  Philosophical  Foundations:  Comments  on  the  Apel-Habermas  Debate’, 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 23(4), (1997), pp. 41-69, here pp. 41-48 and 51-62; 
M. K. Power, ‘Habermas and the Counterfactual Imagination’, in M. Rosenfeld 
and  A.  Arato,  eds.,  Habermas  on  Law  and  Democracy:  Critical  Exchanges, 
Berkeley (California: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 207-225, here p. 
207; G. Raulet,  ‘Critique de la raison communicationnelle’, in Bouchindhomme 
and Rochlitz, eds., Habermas, la raison, la critique, pp. 69-103, here pp. 75-79; J. 
B. Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and  
Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 82-84; and 
A. Wellmer, ‘Practical Philosophy and the Theory of Society: On the Problem of 
the Normative Foundations of a Critical Social Science’, in S. Benhabib and F. R. 
Dallmayr, eds.,  The Communicative Ethics Controversy (Cambridge, Mass., 1990 
[1979]), pp. 293-329, here, p. 296.
2 See, for example, Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary  
Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action, pp. 85-86, 93, 97-99, and 102-103.
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‘systematically distorted communication’.3 Although the significance of 
these two concepts for Habermas’s communication-theoretic approach to 
the  social  has  been  widely  recognised  and  extensively  debated  in  the 
literature4,  their  overall  importance  for  a  critical  theory  of  human 
empowerment  and  disempowerment  has  hardly  been  explored  in  a 
satisfying manner. At first glance, it seems that these two concepts stand 
in a contradictory, yet complementary, relationship: whilst the possibility 
of communication free from domination is diametrically opposed to the 
3 See, for example, ibid., pp. 129-170.
4 On the concept of the ‘ideal speech situation’, see, for example: K.-O. Apel, ‘Is the 
Ethics  of  the Ideal  Communication Community a  Utopia? On the  Relationship 
between Ethics, Utopia, and the Critique of Utopia’, in Benhabib and Dallmayr, 
eds., The Communicative Ethics Controversy, pp. 23-59, esp. pp. 24-25, 33-35, and 
42-51;  S.  Benhabib,  ‘Afterword:  Communicative  Ethics  and  Contemporary 
Controversies  in  Practical  Philosophy’,  in  Benhabib  and  Dallmayr,  eds.,  The 
Communicative Ethics Controversy, pp. 330-369, here pp. 330-331 and 343-345; 
R. J. M. Bernstein,  Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of  
Critical Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 47-57; D. Böhler, ‘Transcendental 
Pragmatics and Critical Morality: On the Possibility and Moral Significance of a 
Self-Enlightenment  of  Reason’,  in  Benhabib  and  Dallmayr,  eds.,  The 
Communicative Ethics Controversy, pp. 111-150, esp. pp. 114, 132-133, and 136; 
M. Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 31, 172n.8, and 172-173n.9; R. A. Factor and S. P. 
Turner,  ‘The  Critique  of  Positivist  Social  Science  in  Leo  Strauss  and  Jürgen 
Habermas’,  Sociological Analysis  & Theory 7(3) (1977),  pp.  185-206, here pp. 
194, 196, and 201-202; R. Geuss,  The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and 
the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 65-75; 
M.  J.  Matustik,  ‘Habermas  on  Communicative  Reason  and  Performative 
Contradiction’,  New German Critique 47, (1989), pp. 143-172, here pp. 159 and 
166-167; L. Ray, ‘Pragmatism and Critical Theory’,  European Journal of Social  
Theory 7(3),  (2004),  pp.  307-321, here pp.  309 and 315-317; and A. Trautsch, 
‘Glauben  und  Wissen.  Jürgen  Habermas  zum  Verhältnis  von  Philosophie  und 
Religion’, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 111(1), (2004), pp. 180-198, here p. 183.
On the concept of ‘systematically distorted communication’, see, for example: J. 
Bohman, ‘Formal Pragmatics and Social Criticism: The Philosophy of Language 
and the Critique of Ideology in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action’, 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 12(4), (1986), pp. 331-352, esp. pp. 332-333 and 
336-344; G. Borradori,  Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen  
Habermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 
35; N. Crossley, ‘On Systematically Distorted Communication: Bourdieu and the 
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reality  of  distorted  communication,  the  empowering  features  of  the 
former can challenge the disempowering consequences of the latter. This 
essay is an attempt to contribute to a more fine-grained understanding of 
the relationship between the empowerment and the disempowerment of 
the  subject  in  Habermas’s  communication-theoretic  approach  to  the 
social. Challenging idealistic and fatalistic conceptions of the social, the 
paper makes a case for the view that a comprehensive critical theory of 
society needs to account for  both the emancipatory and the repressive 
potentials of language if it seeks to do justice to both the empowering and 
the disempowering potentials of the subject.
The paper is structured as follows. The first part argues that the self-
formation of the subject is essentially characterised by a constant struggle 
between self-actualisation and self-alienation. The second part suggests 
that the construction of society is unavoidably shaped by the relationship 
between  communicative  processes  of  deliberation  and  systemic 
imperatives  of  functionalisation.  The  third  part  explains  why  the 
development of the human species cannot be understood without taking 
into  account  the  interdependence  between  cognition  and  action.  The 
fourth part looks into the anthropological presuppositions that undergird 
the early Habermas’s communication-theoretic conception of the subject. 
The fifth part illustrates why the consolidation of emancipatory speech 
situations is a precondition for the creation of empowering life situations. 
The sixth part elucidates why the spread of distortive speech situations is 
conducive  to  the  emergence  of  disempowering  life  situations.  The 
seventh part  puts forward the view that  the very possibility of  society 
depends on the subject’s existential orientation towards intelligibility.
Socio-Analysis  of  Publics’,  in  N.  Crossley  and  J.  M.  Roberts,  eds.,  After  
Habermas:  New  Perspectives  on  the  Public  Sphere (Oxford: 
Blackwell/Sociological  Review,  2004),  pp.  88-112,  esp.  pp.  88-89 and 109;  A. 
Edgar,  The  Philosophy  of  Habermas (Montreal  &  Kingston,  Ithaca:  McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2005), pp. 153-157; Fultner, ‘Translator's Introduction’, 
pp.  xx-xxi;  Müller-Doohm, ‘Kritik in  kritischen Theorien.  Oder:  Wie kritisches 
Denken  selber  zu  rechtfertigen  sei’,  pp.  88  and  92-94;  and  M.  Pusey,  Jürgen 
Habermas (London: Routledge, 1987/1995), pp. 69-75.
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I.
Given its interest in the normative nature of social life, critical theory has 
always been concerned with the exploration of both the emancipatory and 
the repressive potentials of human existence. From the point of view of 
critical  theory,  the  dialectics  between  the  empowering  and  the 
disempowering  forces  of  the  human  being-in-the-world  manifest 
themselves  in  the  antagonistic  interplay  between  emancipation  and 
domination. As a species capable of emancipation, we are able to liberate 
ourselves  from  structural  sources  of  unnecessary  constraints  and 
repression. As a species capable of domination, we are able to construct 
systemic  imperatives  which  obstruct  the  possibility  of  human  self-
realisation.
To be sure, different critical theories of society put forward different 
conceptions  of  the human self  in  order  to  account  for  our  ambivalent 
situatedness  between  emancipation  and  domination.  From  a  Kantian 
perspective,  we  are  rational entities  equipped  with  the  capacity  to 
determine  our  lives  by  virtue  of  reason.5 According  to  Hegelian 
parameters, we are intersubjective entities seeking to affirm our existence 
by virtue of mutual recognition.6 Relying on the Marxian conception of 
the world, we are productive entities able to shape the course of history 
by virtue of labour.7 From a Freudian point of view, we are desiderative 
entities  deemed to  project  ourselves  upon  the  world  by  virtue  of  our 
sexual  unconscious.8 In  Husserlian  terms,  we  are  experiential entities 
condemned  to  attribute  meaning  to  our  existence  by  virtue  of  our 
lifeworld.9 Within the Heideggerian universe,  we are  linguistic entities 
5 See I.  Kant,  Critique of  Practical  Reason,  translated and edited  by M. Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1788]).
6 See G. W. F. Hegel and L. Rauch, Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of  
the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-6), trans. L. Rauch (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1983).
7 See K. Marx and F. Engels, ‘The German Ideology’, in D. McLellan, ed.,  Karl  
Marx:  Selected  Writings,  2nd  Edition  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press, 
2000/1977 [1846]), pp. 175-208.
8 See S. Freud,  The Ego and the Id, trans. J. Riviere and J. Strachey, Rev. Edition 
(London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1962 [1923]).
9 See E. Husserl and L. Landgrebe,  Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a  
Genealogy of Logic, trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (revised and edited by L. 
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destined to build the house of being by virtue of language.10 Following 
the Gadamerian vision, we are prejudiced entities prone to make sense of 
the  world  by  virtue  of  culturally  contingent  preconceptions.11 In 
accordance with the Habermasian account of the human species, we are 
communicative entities  able  to  construct  society  by  virtue  of  the 
intersubjective force of mutual understanding.12
What these theoretical approaches have in common is that they seek to 
identify  the  species-constitutive  elements  of  human  existence.  What 
distinguishes  these  perspectives  from  one  another,  however,  is  their 
presuppositional  specificity:  they  offer  different  accounts  of  the 
foundational elements which largely determine the constitution of human 
society.  It  may  be  relatively  uncontroversial  to  assume  that human 
existence is shaped by both emancipatory and repressive forces. Yet, it is 
far from uncontroversial  what these forces exactly are and what kind of 
impact they may have upon the development of society. To the extent that 
the realisation of our species-constitutive potentials is a crucial source of 
self-actualisation  (Selbstverwirklichung),  the  repression  of  these 
potentials is a decisive source of self-alienation (Selbstentfremdung). The 
emancipation of the human species depends on its capacity to unfold its 
self-empowering  potentials;  the  domination  of  the  human  species  is 
rooted in society’s power to control and repress these potentials.
II.
From a  Habermasian  perspective,  both social  emancipation  and social 
domination  cannot  be  dissociated  from  the  constitution  of  linguistic 
communication.13 A society oriented towards emancipation is a society in 
Landgrebe, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973 [1939]).
10 See  M.  Heidegger,  Pathmarks (edited  by  W.  McNeill,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1998).
11 See  H.-G.  Gadamer,  Truth  and Method,  2nd  Edition  (translation  revised  by  J. 
Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall, London: Sheed & Ward, 1989 [1975]).
12 See J. Habermas, ‘What is Universal Pragmatics?’, in his Communication and the  
Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984 [1976]), 
pp. 1-68.
13 See, for example, J. Habermas,  The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2:  
Lifeworld  and System:  A Critique  of  Functionalist  Reason,  trans.  T.  McCarthy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987 [1981]), hereafter TCA II, pp. 374-403.
86 Pli 20 (2009)
which  communicative  processes  contribute  to  the  deliberative 
rationalisation  of  human  coexistence.  A  society  oriented  towards 
domination, by contrast, is a society in which communicative processes 
are colonised by the  systemic rationalisation of human coexistence. The 
more a given society is capable of determining its development through 
the coordinative force of communicative action, the more its existence 
depends  on  intersubjectively  constituted  processes  of  deliberative 
rationalisation.  The  more  a  given  society  is  prone  to  determine  its 
development through the success-oriented force of purposive action, the 
more  its  existence  is  shaped  by  instrumentally  driven  mechanisms  of 
systemic rationalisation. From a Habermasian point of view, then, human 
emancipation  is  intimately  interrelated  with  communicative  autonomy, 
that  is,  with  people’s  deliberative  capacity  to  coordinate  –  and,  if 
necessary,  discuss  –  their  actions  by  relating  to  one  another 
communicatively.  Human  domination,  on  the  other  hand,  is  closely 
intertwined with functional heteronomy, that is, with society’s purposive 
capacity  to  influence – and,  if  required,  control  –  people’s  actions  by 
steering them systemically.
Within the Habermasian architecture of the social, the instrumentally 
driven system is diametrically opposed to the communicatively structured 
lifeworld.14 Whereas  the  former  is  maintained  through  functionalist 
rationality,  which  is  built  into  the  purposive  construction  of  both  the 
polity and the economy, the latter is shaped by communicative rationality, 
which is intrinsic to the coordinative construction of humanity. Just as the 
increasing  bureaucratisation  and  commodification  of  society  are 
indicative  of  the  growing  functionalisation  of  human  reality,  the 
communicative  structuration  of  the  lifeworld  is  symptomatic  of  the 
discursive mediation of human interactions. The more the polity and the 
economy succeed in imposing their purposive-rational imperatives on the 
lifeworld, the more our everyday relations are colonised by the functional 
necessities of  the system. Thus,  according to Habermasian parameters, 
the relationship between emancipation and domination can be understood 
in  terms  of  the  interplay  between  lifeworld  and  system:  whereas  the 
empowering force of communicative reason is anchored in the lifeworld, 
the disempowering force of functionalist reason is imposed upon society 
by  the  system.  Actors’  communicative  autonomy,  developed  in  the 
lifeworld,  is  antithetical  to their  functional  heteronomy, enforced upon 
14 See ibid., pp. 153-197.
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them by the system. The communicative nature of the lifeworld is the 
cradle of social emancipation; the instrumental nature of the system, by 
contrast, is the main structural source of social domination.
III.
Despite  the  substantial  differences  between  his  ‘early’ and  his  ‘late’ 
writings15,  Habermas’s  social  theory  is  characterised  by  one  central 
conviction:  the  idea  that  communicative  action  –  i.e.  action  oriented 
towards mutual understanding – is an emancipatory force. The existential 
significance  of  the  emancipatory  nature  of  communicative  action  is 
expressed in the early Habermasian distinction between three knowledge-
constitutive interests:16 (i) the empirical-analytic sciences are driven by 
our technical cognitive interest in controlling the world, (ii) the historical-
hermeneutic  sciences  are  guided by our  practical cognitive interest  in 
reaching a communicatively mediated understanding about the world, and 
(iii) the critically oriented sciences articulate our emancipatory cognitive 
interest  in  liberating the human world  from dependence  on  repressive 
forms of power. This anthropological account of the relationship between 
knowledge and interests obliges us to abandon the dream of scientific 
neutrality:  the  human  production  of  knowledge  is  –  always  and 
unavoidably  –  interest-laden.  If  our  technical  orientation  towards 
instrumentality is fundamental to the preservation of humanity, and if our 
practical  orientation  towards  intersubjectivity is  essential  to  the 
construction of society, our emancipatory orientation towards  reflexivity 
is crucial to the formation of human autonomy and social responsibility.
15 The importance of these differences is reflected in the fact that, on some occasions, 
the ‘late’ Habermas explicitly distances himself from the ‘early’ Habermas. See, 
for example, J. Habermas, ‘Nach dreißig Jahren: Bemerkungen zu Erkenntnis und 
Interesse’, in Müller-Doohm, ed.,  Das Interesse der Vernunft: Rückblicke auf das  
Werk von Jürgen Habermas seit "Erkenntnis und Interesse", pp. 12-20, esp. pp. 12-
16, 18, and 20.
16 See J. Habermas, ‘Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective’, in his 
Knowledge and Human Interests,  trans.  J.  J.  Shapiro (Cambridge:  Polity  Press, 
1987  [1965/1968]),  pp.  301-317.  See  also  J.  Habermas,  ‘Reason  and  Interest: 
Retrospect  on  Kant  and  Fichte’,  in  ibid.,  pp.  191-213,  and  J.  Habermas,  ‘A 
Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests’, in ibid., pp. 351-386.
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Whereas from a Nietzschean and Foucauldian point of view we have a 
will to power17, from a Kantian and Habermasian perspective we have a 
will to reason.18 In fact, reason  is power: a rational power derived from 
and developed through the communicative experience of the world. As 
the  early  Habermas  insists,  our  will  to  reason  is  “a  will  to 
emancipation”:19
I mean the experience of the emancipatory power of reflection, 
which  the  subject  experiences  in  itself  to  the  extent  that  it 
becomes transparent to itself in the history of its genesis.  The 
experience  of  reflection  articulates  itself  substantially  in  the 
concept of a self-formative process.  Methodically it leads to a 
standpoint from which the identity of reason with the will to 
reason freely arises.  In self-reflection, knowledge for the sake 
of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy 
and responsibility (Mündigkeit).  For the pursuit of reflection 
knows itself as a movement of emancipation.  Reason is at the 
same time subject to the interest in reason.  We can say that it 
obeys  an  emancipatory  cognitive  interest,  which  aims at  the 
pursuit of reflection.20
In other words, our emancipatory cognitive interest in critical reflection is 
not  a  mere  fantasy;  far  from  representing  a  fictitious  element  of  an 
ideological  imaginary,  our  interest  in  liberation  through  reflection 
manifests itself in the emancipatory nature of human reason. “Indeed, the 
category of cognitive interest is authenticated only by the interest innate 
in  reason.  The  technical  and  practical  cognitive  interests  can  be 
comprehended unambiguously as knowledge-constitutive interests only in 
connection  with  the  emancipatory  cognitive  interest  of  rational 
17 See  F.  W.  Nietzsche,  The  Will  to  Power,  trans.  W.  A.  Kaufmann  and  R.  J. 
Hollingdale  (London:  Weidenfeld  and  Nicolson,  1968),  and  M.  Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (edited by 
C. Gordon, translated by C. Gordon [et al.], Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980).
18 See Kant,  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  and  Habermas,  On the  Pragmatics  of  
Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in  the Theory of Communicative Action 
(esp. pp. 85-103).
19 Habermas, ‘Reason and Interest: Retrospect on Kant and Fichte’, p. 205.
20 Ibid., pp. 197-198 (italics in original).
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reflection.”21 Our technical cognitive interest  in  controlling our  natural 
environment and our practical cognitive interest in  communicating with 
our  social  environment  cannot  be  divorced  from  our  emancipatory 
cognitive  interest  in  self-realising ourselves  through  our  natural  and 
social environment. Our will to exercise control  over the world and our 
will  to  communicate  with the  world  are  embedded  in  our  will  to 
emancipate ourselves through the world.  
To  be  sure,  the  tripartite  typology  of  our  knowledge-constitutive 
interests is indicative of the cognitive complexity of human ontology: as 
purposive,  communicative,  and contemplative entities,  we are  oriented 
towards  instrumentality,  intersubjectivity,  and  reflexivity.  The  self-
formative  nature  of  human  existence  is  based  on  the  purposive, 
communicative, and contemplative potentials of human reason. Given the 
teleological  (zielorientiert),  societal  (gesellschaftsorientiert),  and 
thoughtful (gedankenorientiert) nature of our immersion in the world, we 
need to face up to the inevitable interest-ladenness of our existence. “It is 
in accomplishing self-reflection that reason grasps itself as interested”22, 
and  it  is  the  task  of  critical  theory  to  uncover  the  interest-laden 
constitution of rational entities. We are oriented towards instrumentality, 
intersubjectivity,  and  reflexivity  because  we  have  an  interest  in  the 
preservation of humanity, the construction of society, and the formation 
of autonomy.
IV.
The early Habermasian view that our immersion in life is permeated by 
an “[o]rientation toward technical control, toward mutual understanding 
in the conduct of life, and toward emancipation from seemingly “natural” 
constraint”23 is based on five anthropological assumptions.
The  first  presupposition  is  that  “[t]he  achievements  of  the 
transcendental  subject  have  their  basis  in  the  natural  history  of  the  
human species”24. Thus, far from regarding the transcendental subject as a 
supernatural  force  placed  outside  history,  the  human  species  is  to  be 
21 Ibid, p. 198.
22 Ibid., p. 212 (italics removed from the entire sentence).
23 Habermas, ‘Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective’, p. 311.
24 Ibid., p. 312 (italics in original).
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conceived of as a collective actor situated within the horizon of worldly 
immanence.  In  other  words,  ‘transcendental’  means  not  ‘above’  or 
‘outside’ the world but necessarily ‘within’ and ‘through’ the world. The 
history of the transcendental subject is the history of a worldly subject 
compelled  to  come  to  terms  with  the  conditions  of  its  own  natural 
constitution.
The  second  hypothesis  is  that  “knowledge  equally  serves  as  an 
instrument  and transcends  mere  self-preservation”25. Instead  of  falling 
into  the  naturalistic  fallacy  of  reducing  the  production  of  human 
knowledge to a mere manifestation of our purposive immersion in the 
world, here our cognitive relation to the world is also understood in terms 
of  its  normative  and  reflexive  dimensions.  As  subjects  capable  of 
cognition and action we are oriented not only towards self-preservation 
but also towards communication and reflection. The tripartite constitution 
of  our  knowledge-guiding  interests  emanates  from  our  purposive, 
communicative,  and  reflective  capacities  as  a  species.  Given  our 
communicative  capacity  to  develop  codes  of  normativity  and  our 
emancipatory capacity to contemplate ourselves through the exercise of 
self-reflexivity, knowledge must not be reduced to an expression of our 
teleological capacity to convert the world into a purpose-driven universe 
of  instrumentality.  For  “the three knowledge-constitutive  interests  […] 
derive both from nature and  from the cultural break with nature. Along 
with the tendency to  realize natural  drives they have incorporated the 
tendency toward release from the constraint of nature.”26 Not only do we 
aim to preserve our life as a species, but we also seek to create “the good 
life”27 for ourselves as a species.
The  third  contention  is  that  “knowledge-constitutive  interests  take 
form  in  the  medium  of  work,  language,  and  power”28. Rather  than 
relegating our knowledge-constitutive interests to the scholastic sphere of 
philosophical abstraction, the point is to recognise that they are anchored 
in ubiquitous forces of human reality: work, language, and power. Our 
technical cognitive interest in controlling the world is expressed in the 
purposive force  of  labour;  our  practical  cognitive  interest  in 
communicating with the world is represented in the intersubjective force 
25 Ibid., p. 313 (italics in original).
26 Ibid., p. 312 (italics in original).
27 Ibid., p. 313 (italics removed).
28 Ibid. (italics in original).
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of  language;  and  our  emancipatory  cognitive  interest  in  realising 
ourselves in the world is challenged by the performative force of power. 
These three existential orientations – which are indicative of the cross-
cultural validity of the motivational driving forces of human cognition – 
“originate in the interest structure of a species that is linked in its roots to 
definite means of social organization”29. To the extent that the production 
of knowledge is intimately interrelated with the production of human life, 
our  knowledge-constitutive  interests  (erkenntnisleitende  Interessen) 
reflect life-constitutive interests (lebensleitende Interessen) of the human 
species.  Only  if  we  account  for  the  fact  that  we  are  a  purposive, 
communicative,  and  reflective  species  can  we  comprehend  that  our 
knowledge cannot be dissociated from work, language, and power.
The fourth assertion is that “in the power of self-reflection, knowledge 
and interest are one”30. The distinctively human exercise of self-reflection 
is endowed with an emblematic status because it illustrates that we can be 
existentially closest to ourselves when reflectively most distanced from 
ourselves. Distancing ourselves from ourselves contemplatively allows us 
to  approximate  ourselves  to  ourselves  responsibly.  The  power  of 
reflexivity is closely tied to the power of linguisticality: speaking about 
the  world  we  are  capable  of  reflecting  upon  the  world.  The  self-
understanding  (Selbstverständnis)  of  every  subject  is  inconceivable 
without mutual understanding (Verständigung). Just as there is no reason 
(Verstand)  without  communication  (Verständigung),  there  is  no 
communication (Verständigung) without comprehension (Verständnis). It 
is through language that, in a collective effort of humanisation, we have 
learned to reflect upon ourselves by reflecting with and through others. 
“The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for 
it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only 
thing  whose  nature  we  can  know:  language.  Through  its  structure, 
autonomy  and  responsibility  are  posited  for  us.  Our  first  sentence 
expresses  unequivocally  the  intention  of  universal  and  unconstrained 
consensus.”31 Our  orientation  towards  reaching  understanding 
(Verständigung)  anticipates  our  orientation  towards  agreement 
(Einverständnis), for subjects capable of mutual understanding are also, 
at least in principle, capable of mutual agreement. Understanding implies 
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 314 (italics in original).
31 Ibid. (italics in original).
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the will to understanding; agreement presupposes the will to agreement; 
and “[r]eason also means the will to reason. In self-reflection knowledge 
for  the  sake  of  knowledge  attains  congruence  with  the  interest  in 
autonomy and responsibility. The emancipatory cognitive interest aims at 
the  pursuit  of  reflection  as  such.”32 As  children  of  humanity  we  are 
carriers of communicative reflexivity.
The fifth, and final, thesis is that “the unity of knowledge and interest  
proves itself in a dialectic that takes the historical traces of suppressed  
dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed”33. If knowledge is 
articulated  through  human  language  and  if  knowledge  is  a  carrier  of 
human interests, then our linguistic relation to the world is impregnated 
with  the  interest-laden  nature  of  human  life.  The  ideal  nature  of  an 
emancipatory  social  formation  is  anticipated  by  the  ideal  nature  of 
emancipatory communication. “However, only in an emancipated society, 
whose members’ autonomy and responsibility had been realized, would 
communication have developed into the non-authoritarian and universally 
practical dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted 
ego identity and our idea of true consensus are always implicitly derived. 
To  this  extent  the  truth  of  statements  is  based  on  anticipating  the 
realization  of  the  good  life.  […]  [T]he  autonomy  and  responsibility 
posited with the structure of language are not only anticipated but real.”34 
In the long run, “the path to unconstrained communication”35 is doomed 
to  failure  without  the  path  to  an  unconstrained  society.  The 
understanding-oriented nature of linguisticality, which endows us with a 
sense of both autonomy and responsibility, is rooted in the understanding-
oriented nature of society: our capacity to talk with one another emanates 
from our need to live with one another. A society without dialogue is just 
as absurd as a dialogue without society. It is from mouth to mouth that we 
have converted the performative capacity of our Mund into the normative 
capacity of Mündigkeit. Our reliance upon mutual intelligibility has led us 
to develop a sense of social responsibility.
Taken together, the five theses outlined above lay the presuppositional 
foundation  for  Habermas’s  communication-theoretic  conception  of  the 
human subject. In other words, a subject capable of speech and action is 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 315 (italics in original).
34 Ibid., p. 314.
35 Ibid., p. 315.
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(i)  a  transcendental  subject,  (ii)  a  cultural  subject,  (iii)  a  cognitional 
subject,  (iv)  a  moral  subject,  and  (v)  a  dialogical  subject.  (i)  As  a 
transcendental subject, the human species is a collective historical actor 
spatiotemporally  situated  in  the  world.  (ii)  As  a  cultural subject,  the 
human  species  elevates  itself  above  nature  and  places  itself  within 
society, transcending the drive for self-preservation through the urge for 
self-realisation.  (iii)  As  a  cognitional subject,  the  human  species  is 
capable of mobilising its purposive, linguistic, and reflective capacities to 
determine  the  course  of  history.  (iv)  As  a  moral subject,  the  human 
species is able to develop a sense of autonomy and responsibility through 
the communicative force of consensual intelligibility. (v) As a dialogical 
subject, the human species is equipped with the communicative ability to 
attribute  meaning  to  the  world  by  virtue  of  the  quotidian  exercise  of 
mutual  understanding.  These  five  anthropological  features  are 
fundamental characteristics of all subjects capable of speech and action.
V.
Every  subject  capable  of  forming  real  speech  acts  is  also  capable  of 
constructing  ideal  speech  situations.  If  we  recognise  that  “the  formal 
qualities  of  ideal  speech situations”36 are  “those structural  elements  of 
communication which make reasoning possible”37,  we can comprehend 
that the idealising presuppositions of speech acts represent constitutive 
elements  of  ordinary  language,  rather  than  hypothetical  conditions  of 
scholastic thought experiments. In other words, the ideal speech situation 
is  presupposed by  linguistic  communication,  since  the  latter  always 
already contains  the  structural  characteristics  of  the  former.  Thus,  the 
ideal speech situation is implicitly present every time subjects capable of 
speech  and  action  engage  in  the  linguistic  exercise  of  reasoning.  To 
assume that  “the  emancipatory  interest  in  knowledge has  a  derivative 
status”38 means to suppose that both the technical interest in shaping the 
physical world and the practical interest in communicating with the social 
world are inextricably linked to the emancipatory interest  in reflecting 
upon  the  world.  As  self-formative  beings,  we  are  able  to  get  rid  of 
36 Habermas, ‘A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests’, p. 362.
37 Ibid., pp. 362-363.
38 Ibid., p. 371 (italics in original).
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unnecessary constraints and create the social conditions of a ‘good life’. 
In  this  sense,  the possibility  of  the ideal  speech situation  hints  at  the 
possibility of an ideal  life situation, that is, at the viability of a society 
whose development depends on people’s deliberative capacities.
To  be  sure,  communicative  deliberation  is  preponderant  over 
communicative distortion:  “the structure of  distorted communication is 
not  ultimate;  it  has  its  basis  in  the  logic  of  undistorted  language 
communication.”39 Put differently, distorted forms of communication are 
always  parasitic  upon  undistorted  forms  of  communication.  For  if, 
following Habermas,  we accept  that  communicative  action is  oriented 
towards reaching understanding, then distorted forms of communication 
can  diverge  from,  but  not  undermine,  the  foundational  status  of 
undistorted forms of communication. The point is not to put forward the 
somewhat idealistic view that the ideal speech situation is the prototype 
of ordinary communication. Rather, the point is to acknowledge that even 
in distorted forms of communication, which substantially deviate from 
ideal speech scenarios, we need to presuppose the conditions of an ideal 
speech situation in order  to allow for  the very possibility of  linguistic 
communication.  Our  linguistic  orientation  towards  intelligibility 
constitutes the existential ground for our normative orientation towards 
responsibility.
In a certain way, mature autonomy [Mündigkeit] is the sole idea 
which we have at our disposal in the sense of the philosophical 
tradition […] for in every speech act the  telos of reaching an 
understanding [Verständigung]  is  already inherent.  “With the 
very  first  sentence  the  intention  of  a  general  and  voluntary 
consensus is unmistakably enunciated.” […] Wittgenstein has 
remarked that the concept of reaching an understanding lies in 
the concept of language. We can only say in a self-explicative 
sense that language communication serves this reaching of an 
understanding. Every understanding reached is confirmed in a 
reasonable  consensus,  as  we  say;  otherwise  it  does  not 
represent a  real understanding. Competent orators know that 
every consensus attained can in fact be deceptive; but they must 
39 J. Habermas, ‘Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and 
Praxis’, in his Theory and Practice, trans. J. Viertel (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988 
[1971]), pp. 1-40, here p. 17.
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always  have  been  in  possession  of  the  prior  concept  of  the 
rational  consensus underlying the concept  of  a deceptive (or 
merely compulsory) consensus. Reaching an understanding is a 
normative  concept;  everyone who speaks  a  natural  language 
has intuitive knowledge of it and therefore is confident of being 
able, in principle, to distinguish a true consensus from a false 
one.40
In  other  words,  the  difference  between  a  true  consensus and  a  false 
consensus lies  at  the  heart  of  the  distinction  between  undistorted 
communication  and distorted communication.  Every subject capable of 
speech and action knows that an attained consensus can be true on the 
surface and false  in reality.  A consensus which is  forced upon people 
without  taking into account  the opinions and necessities  of  everybody 
affected can hardly claim to be a true form of agreement. By contrast, a 
consensus which has been reached by people who succeed in considering 
the opinions and necessities of every member concerned can indeed assert 
to  be  a  genuine  form of  agreement.  The  concept  of  the  ideal  speech 
situation,  then,  captures  what  is  always  already  real:  the  orientation 
towards understanding and agreement inherent in ordinary language.
The Habermasian notion of the ideal speech situation is intimately tied 
to the idea that speech acts are oriented towards reaching understanding, 
for it epitomises the understanding-oriented  Gesellschaftlichkeit41 which 
is built into the Sprachlichkeit42 of human existence. The utopian moment 
of human existence is not simply a mental fantasy, but it is built into the 
very  structure  of  language,  since,  following  Habermas,  “in  every 
discourse  we  are  mutually  required  to  presuppose  an  ideal  speech 
situation”43.  In  the  ideal  speech  situation  “communication  is  impeded 
neither  by  external  contingent  forces  nor,  more  importantly,  by 
constraints arising from the structure of communication itself.  The ideal 
speech situation excludes systematic distortion of communication.”44 To 
be more precise, the thesis that the ideal speech situation constitutes a 
40 Ibid. (italics in original).
41 Literal translation from German into English: ‘sociability’.
42 Literal translation from German into English: ‘linguisticality’.
43 Habermas,  On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the  
Theory of Communicative Action, p. 97.
44 Ibid.
96 Pli 20 (2009)
necessary presupposition of communication is based on the following six 
key assumptions:
(i) the understanding-oriented nature of communication allows us to 
come to an intersubjectively established agreement;
(ii) we can distinguish between a genuine and a deceptive agreement;
(iii) in order to guarantee that an agreement is genuine, we need to rely 
on the unforced force of the better argument;
(iv) genuine  agreement  can  only  be  claimed  to  exist  as  long  as 
communication  is  not obstructed  by  internal  or  external 
constraints; 
(v) communication that is genuinely free from internal and external 
constraints presupposes the symmetrical distribution of chances to 
select  and  employ  constative,  regulative,  expressive,  and 
communicative speech acts; and
(vi) only a situation in which this symmetrical distribution of chances 
is guaranteed can be called an ideal speech situation.45
45 Cf. J. B. Thompson, ‘Universal Pragmatics’, in J. B. Thompson and D. Held, eds., 
Habermas: Critical Debates (London: Macmillan 1982), pp. 116-133, here p. 128. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  Habermas  dissociates  himself  from the  term 
‘ideal  speech  situation’ in  his  later  works  in  order  to  avoid  an  ‘essentialist 
misunderstanding’, as he calls it. According to this misunderstanding, the ‘ideal’ or 
‘transcendental’ presuppositions  of  every  speech  act  are  located  outside,  rather 
than  within,  the  world.  Yet,  Habermas  makes  it  clear  that  the  ‘ideal’  or 
‘transcendental’ presuppositions  inherent  in  ordinary  speech  are  always  world-
embedded (weltimmanent). – See J. Habermas, ‘The Sociological Translation of 
the  Concept  of  Deliberative  Politics’,  in  his  Between  Facts  and  Norms: 
Contributions  to  a  Discourse  Theory  of  Law and  Democracy,  trans.  W.  Rehg 
(Cambridge:  Polity  Press,  1996  [1992]),  pp.  315-328,  here  p.  323:  “The 
counterfactual  presuppositions assumed by participants in  argumentation indeed 
open up a perspective allowing them to go beyond local practices of justification 
and  to  transcend  the  provinciality  of  their  spatiotemporal  contexts  that  are 
inescapable in action and experience.  This perspective thus enables them to do 
justice to the meaning of  context-transcending validity claims. But with context-
transcending validity claims, they are not themselves transported into the beyond 
of an ideal realm of noumenal beings. […] This thought experiment [of the ideal 
communication community] […] refers to concrete societies that are situated in 
space and time and already differentiated.” (Italics in original.)
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In  short,  the  ideal  speech  situation  is  an  intersubjectively  created 
communicative space that allows the speakers to reach an agreement by 
virtue of the force of the better argument, without this communicative 
force  being  hindered  by  internal  or  external  constraints,  and  with  a 
symmetrical distribution of chances to choose and utter speech acts.  
On the whole, the concept of the ideal speech situation has five main 
macrotheoretical implications for Habermas’s account of the social. First, 
it  locates  the  emancipatory  potential  of  the  social  in  the  subject’s 
On the Habermasian notion of the ‘ideal speech situation’, see also, for example: J. 
Habermas,  ‘Dogmatism,  Reason,  and  Decision:  On  Theory  and  Praxis  in  Our 
Scientific Civilization’, in his  Theory and Practice, (1988 [1963]), pp. 253-282, 
here  pp.  279  and  281;  J.  Habermas,  ‘Towards  a  Theory  of  Communicative 
Competence’,  Inquiry 13(4), (1970), pp. 360-375, here pp. 367 and 371-374; J. 
Habermas,  ‘Introduction:  Some Difficulties  in  the Attempt to  Link Theory and 
Praxis’, p. 17; TCA I, p. 42; J. Habermas, ‘Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of 
Philosophical  Justification’,  in  his  Moral  Consciousness  and  Communicative 
Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1990 [1983]), pp. 43-115, here pp. 86-94; Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social  
Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action, pp. 85-
86,  93,  97-99,  and  102-103;  J.  Habermas,  ‘An  Alternative  Way  out  of  the 
Philosophy of the Subject: Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason’, in 
his  The Philosophical  Discourse  of  Modernity,  trans.  F.  Lawrence (Cambridge: 
Polity  Press,  1987  [1985]),  pp.  294-326,  here  p.  323;  J.  Habermas,  ‘Morality, 
Society, and Ethics: An Interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen’, in his Justification 
and  Application:  Remarks  on  Discourse  Ethics,  trans.  C.  Cronin  (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1993 [1990]), pp. 147-176, here pp. 163-165; J. Habermas, ‘Remarks 
on Discourse Ethics’, in his Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse  
Ethics, (1993 [1991]), pp. 19-111, here pp. 54-57; Habermas, ‘The Sociological 
Translation of the Concept of Deliberative Politics’,  pp. 322-323; J.  Habermas, 
‘Reconciliation  through  the  Public  Use  of  Reason:  Remarks  on  John  Rawls's 
Political Liberalism’,  Journal of Philosophy 92(3), (1995), pp. 109-131, here p. 
117; J. Habermas,  Kommunikatives Handeln und detranszendentalisierte Vernunft 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, Ditzingen, 2001), pp. 7-8, 10-13, 23, 29, 37, 42, 45-47, 52, and 
83-84; and J. Habermas, ‘Freiheit und Determinismus’,  Deutsche Zeitschrift für  
Philosophie 52(6), (2004), pp. 871-890, here p. 875.
In  the  secondary  literature  see,  for  example:  Apel,  ‘Is  the  Ethics  of  the  Ideal 
Communication  Community  a  Utopia?  On  the  Relationship  between  Ethics, 
Utopia, and the Critique of Utopia’, esp. pp. 24-25, 33-35, and 42-51; Benhabib, 
‘Afterword: Communicative Ethics and Contemporary Controversies in Practical 
Philosophy’, pp. 330-331 and 343-345; Bernstein, Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen 
Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory, pp. 47-57; Böhler, ‘Transcendental 
Pragmatics and Critical Morality: On the Possibility and Moral Significance of a 
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discursive capacity (discursive power). Second, it suggests that utopia is 
unavoidably anticipated in every communicative speech act (anticipatory 
power).  Third,  it  detranscendentalises  the  notion  of  counterfactuality 
insofar  as  it  attributes  an  emancipatory  status  to  the  necessary 
presuppositions inherent in ordinary language (ordinary power). Fourth, 
it regards the “counterfactual conditions of the ideal speech situation […] 
as necessary conditions of an emancipated form of life”46 (foundational 
Self-Enlightenment  of  Reason’,  esp.  pp.  114,  132-133,  and  136;  M.  Cooke, 
‘Habermas and Consensus’, European Journal of Philosophy 1(3), (1993), pp. 247-
267,  here  p.  253;  Cooke,  Language  and  Reason:  A  Study  of  Habermas's  
Pragmatics,  pp.  31,  172n.8,  and 172-173n.9;  M. Cooke,  ‘Are Ethical  Conflicts 
Irreconcilable?’, Philosophy & Social Criticism 23(2), (1997), pp. 1-19, here pp. 9-
13; M. Cooke, ‘Redeeming Redemption: The Utopian Dimension of Critical Social 
Theory’,  Philosophy & Social  Criticism 30(4),  (2004),  pp.  413-429;  N.  Davey, 
‘Habermas’ Contribution to Hermeneutic Theory’,  Journal of the British Society  
for Phenomenology 16(2), (1985), pp. 109-131, here pp. 113-114 and 120; Factor 
and Turner, ‘The Critique of Positivist Social Science in Leo Strauss and Jürgen 
Habermas’,  pp.  194,  196,  and  201-202;  A.  Ferrara,  ‘A Critique  of  Habermas’ 
Consensus Theory of Truth’, Philosophy & Social Criticism 13, (1987), pp. 39-67, 
here  pp.  44-45;  Fultner,  ‘Translator's  Introduction’,  pp.  xv-xvi;  F.  I.  Gamwell, 
‘Habermas  and  Apel  on  Communicative  Ethics:  Their  Difference  and  the 
Difference it Makes’, Philosophy & Social Criticism 23(2), (1997), pp. 21-45, here 
p. 37; Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School, 
pp.  65-75;  K.  Günther,  ‘Communicative  Freedom,  Communicative  Power,  and 
Jurisgenesis’, in Rosenfeld and Arato, eds.,  Habermas on Law and Democracy:  
Critical Exchanges, pp. 234-254, esp. pp. 235-236; R. J. Kilby, ‘Critical Thinking, 
Epistemic  Virtue,  and  the  Significance  of  Inclusion:  Reflections  on  Harvey 
Siegel’s Theory of Rationality’,  Educational Theory 54(3), (2004), pp. 299-313, 
here  p.  308;  L.  Koczanowicz,  ‘The  Choice  of  Tradition  and  the  Tradition  of 
Choice:  Habermas’ and  Rorty’s  interpretation  of  Pragmatism’,  Philosophy  & 
Social  Criticism 25(1),  (1999),  pp.  55-70,  here  p.  57;  Matustik,  ‘Habermas on 
Communicative Reason and Performative Contradiction’, pp. 159 and 166-167; T. 
McCarthy, ‘A Theory of Communicative Competence’,  Philosophy of the Social  
Sciences 3(2), (1973), pp. 135-156, pp. 145-148; J. Mendelson, ‘The Habermas-
Gadamer Debate’, New German Critique 18, (1979), pp. 44-73, here pp. 71-73; P. 
Milley, ‘Imagining Good Organizations: Moral Orders or Moral Communities?’, 
Educational Management Administration and Leadership 30(1), (2002), pp. 47-64, 
here  p.  58;  G.  R.  Mitchell,  ‘Did  Habermas  Cede  Nature  to  the  Positivists?’, 
Philosophy and Rhetoric 36(1), (2003), pp. 1-21, here p. 7; Ray, ‘Pragmatism and 
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power).  Fifth,  it  serves  as  a  yardstick  for  the  critical  analysis  of 
systematically distorted communication (normative power).
Thus, the notion of the ideal speech situation allows us to understand 
Habermas’s conception of emancipation in terms of five forms of power. 
(1) Discursive power: If the emancipatory potential of the social is to be 
located in the subject’s discursive capacity, then our ability to shape the 
development of society by virtue of critical reasoning is an indispensable 
feature  of  human  emancipation.  (2)  Anticipatory  power:  If  utopia  is 
unavoidably anticipated in every communicative speech act,  then there 
remains an emancipatory element even in the most repressive forms of 
society, no matter how systematically distorted or structurally deformed 
communication  may  be  in  a  particular  socio-historical  context.  (3) 
Ordinary  power:  If  the  concept  of  the  ideal  speech  situation 
detranscendentalises  the  notion  of  counterfactuality  by  attributing  an 
emancipatory status to the necessary presuppositions inherent in ordinary 
language, then every subject capable of speech and action – regardless of 
its social status and linguistic capital – is equipped with the dispositional 
tools  to  contribute  to  the  consolidation  of  a  consensually  constructed 
society. (4)  Foundational power: If the counterfactual conditions of the 
ideal speech situation can be considered as constitutive elements of an 
emancipated  form  of  life,  then  the  possibility  of  a  society  beyond 
domination depends on the reality of sociality through communication. 
(5) Normative power: If the concept of the ideal speech situation serves as 
a  yardstick  for  the  critical  analysis  of  systematically  distorted 
communication, then the reality of social  domination can be measured 
against the possibility of ideal communication.
VI.
As  a  normative  yardstick,  the  ideal  speech  situation  is  crucial  to 
Habermas’s communication-theoretic critique of power, for we can only 
recognise the factual distortion of language if we are able to identify the 
necessary conditions of its counterfactual non-distortion.
Critical Theory’, pp. 309 and 315-317; and Trautsch, ‘Glauben und Wissen. Jürgen 
Habermas zum Verhältnis von Philosophie und Religion’, p. 183.
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[…] communication can be systematically distorted only if the 
internal organization of speech is disrupted.  This happens if the 
validity  basis  of  linguistic  communication  is  curtailed 
surreptitiously;  that  is,  without  leading  to  a  break  in 
communication  or  to  the  transition  to  openly  declared  and 
permissible  strategic  action.   The validity  basis  of  speech is 
curtailed surreptitiously if  at  least  one of  the three universal 
validity claims […] is violated and communication nonetheless 
continues on the presumption of communicative (not strategic) 
action oriented toward reaching mutual understanding.47
47 Ibid., pp. 154-155 (italics in original). 
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dreißig Jahren: Bemerkungen zu Erkenntnis und Interesse’, pp. 15-18.
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Systematically distorted communication can be regarded as the antithesis 
of  the  ideal  speech  situation,  for  the  former  covertly  violates  the 
presuppositions of the latter. The power of linguistic validity is always 
also the power of discursive transparency: what is communicatively valid 
can be discursively questioned. The power of systematic distortedness is 
always also the power of deceptive secretiveness: what is  strategically 
distorted  can  be  deceptively  concealed.  Whenever  the  endogenous 
validity  of  ordinary  speech  is  surreptitiously  encroached  upon  by  the 
exogenous instrumentality of strategic force, the power of discourse is 
undermined by the power of deception. The more we are caught up in 
distortive deceptiveness, the more powerful is the secretive potential of 
strategic action; the more we engage in argumentative discursiveness, the 
more powerful is the emancipatory potential of communicative action.
Since  the  systematicity  of  distortive  instrumentality  is  always 
parasitically dependent upon the ubiquity of communicative validity, the 
projection of the merely strategic community goes against the structure of 
language,  whereas  the  “projection  of  the  unlimited  communication 
community is backed up by the structure of language itself.”48 Therefore, 
the concept of the ideal speech situation serves both as a detour and as a 
shortcut: as a detour, it idealises the structural conditions under which an 
emancipatory  society  could be  realised;  as  a  shortcut,  it  directly 
recognises that these conditions are  always already existent in ordinary 
language.  Reciprocal  recognition  articulated  through  language  is  the 
recognition  of  the  other  not  only  as  a  conversational  interlocutor 
Oder:  Wie kritisches  Denken selber  zu rechtfertigen sei’,  pp.  88 and 92-94;  F. 
Poupeau, ‘Reasons for Domination, Bourdieu versus Habermas’, in B. Fowler, ed., 
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Sintomer, ‘Bourdieu et Habermas’, in his La démocratie impossible ? Politique et  
modernité chez Weber et  Habermas (Paris:  La Découverte & Syros,  1999), pp. 
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(Gesprächspartner),  but  also  as  an  existential  interlocutor 
(Lebenspartner).  The  ideal  of  an  “unlimited  communication 
community”49 (Kommunikationsgemeinschaft)  is  the  ideal  of  an 
“unlimited  life  community”  (Lebensgemeinschaft).  In  the  long  term, 
human  existence  is  only  conceivable  in  terms  of  consensus-oriented 
coexistence.
Systematically distorted communication is the antinomy of the ideal 
speech situation, for the disempowering features of the former violate the 
empowering aspects of the latter: under the condition of systematically 
distorted communication,  agreements can only be deceptive;  under the 
condition of the ideal speech situation, by contrast, agreements can only 
be genuine.  
In analogy to the notion of the ideal speech situation, the concept of 
systematically distorted communication has five main macrotheoretical 
implications for Habermas’s conception of the social. First, it locates the 
repressive potential  of  the social  in the distortive capacity of  strategic 
action  and systemic  imperatives  (distortive  power).  Second,  it  implies 
that  domination  is,  however  subtly,  reinforced  in  every  systematically 
distorted speech act (reproductive power). Third, it linguistifies the notion 
of  domination  insofar  as  it  ascribes  sociological  significance  to  the 
distortive use of language (performative power). Fourth, it conceives of 
systematically  distorted  communication  as  a  parasitic  deformation  of 
understanding-oriented  action  (parasitic  power).  Fifth,  it  serves  as  a 
yardstick for the critical analysis of the ideal speech situation (normative 
power).
Just  as  the  concept  of  the  ideal  speech  situation  is  central  to 
Habermas’s  conception  of  social  emancipation,  the  concept  of 
systematically distorted communication is fundamental to his notion of 
social  domination.  The  significance  of  systematically  distorted 
communication for Habermas’s communication-theoretic account of the 
social is reflected in its multifaceted power. (1)  Distortive power: If the 
repressive potential of the social is to be located in the distortive potential 
of strategic action and systemic imperatives, then our capacity to shape 
the development of society in accordance with strategic calculations and 
systemic necessities is a constitutive element of human domination. (2) 
49 Ibid., pp. 184 and 188. See also M. Cooke, ‘Habermas, Autonomy and the Identity 
of the Self’, Philosophy & Social Criticism 18(3/4), (1992), pp. 269-291, here pp. 
273-275.
SIMON SUSEN 103
Reproductive  power:  If  domination  is  necessarily  reinforced  in  every 
systematically  distorted  speech  act,  then  there  remains  a  repressive 
element  even  in  seemingly  insignificantly  distorted  forms  of 
communication,  no  matter  how  equally  distributed  and  deliberatively 
structured communication may be in a particular socio-historical context. 
(3)  Performative  power:  If  the  concept  of  systematically  distorted 
communication  linguistifies  the  notion  of  domination  by  ascribing 
sociological  significance  to  the  distortive  use  of  language,  then  every 
subject capable of speech and action – regardless of its social status and 
linguistic capital – is equipped with the dispositional tools to contribute to 
the proliferation of a systematically distorted society. (4) Parasitic power: 
If the deceptive nature of systematically distorted communication can be 
considered as a parasitic deformation of understanding-oriented action, 
then  the  corrosive  force  of  strategic  action  remains  dependent  on  the 
coordinative power of communicative action. (5) Normative power: If the 
concept of systematically distorted communication serves as a yardstick 
for  the  critical  analysis  of  the  ideal  speech  situation,  then  the 
disempowering effects of social domination can only be understood in 
relation to the empowering characteristics of social emancipation.
VII.
The  problem of  systematically  distorted  communication  obliges  us  to 
reflect upon the difference between communicative action and strategic 
action,  that  is,  upon the competing relationship between two forms of 
human action which are fundamental to the construction of social order. 
To be more precise, “communication pathologies can be conceived of as 
the  result  of  a  confusion between  actions  oriented  to  reaching 
understanding  and  actions  oriented  to  success”50.  Undistorted 
communication  occurs  whenever  all  parties  involved  in  the 
communication process are, at least in principle, aware of the nature of 
their interaction. Thus, strategic action is not a source of systematically 
distorted communication per se; it is only a source of distortion if at least 
one  party  engages  in  strategically  motivated  interaction  on  the 
presumption that the encounter is primarily communicative, rather than 
strategic. If “one of the parties is deceiving himself about the fact that he 
50 TCA I, p. 332 (italics added).
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is acting with an attitude oriented to success and is only keeping up the 
appearance of communicative action”51, it is appropriate to characterise 
his action as systematically distorted. Hence,  deception is a constitutive 
component  of  systematically  distorted  communication.  It  is  not  open 
strategic  action  but  concealed strategic  action  which  is  the  breeding 
ground for distorted forms of social  interaction, for it  is  the deceptive 
force of  a distortedly deformed unconscious which can undermine the 
transparent force of our communicatively constructed consciousness.
Distortive  deceptions  can  be  located  on  various  presuppositional 
levels of communicative interactions. “The strongest cases of systematic 
distortions  are  those  in  which  the  speaking  subjects  themselves  are 
unaware  of  their  violation  of  communicative  presuppositions,  such  as 
when  a  competent  speaker  expresses  herself  unintelligibly  without 
realizing it, when one spouse deceives herself about her feelings for the 
other, or when a speaker thinks she is acting in accordance with social 
norms but  is  actually violating them.”52 In other  words,  systematically 
distorted communication undermines the (i) assertive, (ii) normative, (iii) 
expressive,  and (iv)  communicative presuppositions of  speech acts.  (i) 
The assertive nature of language allows us to assume that a speech act is 
true. (ii) The normative nature of language permits us to suppose that a 
speech  act  is  right.  (iii)  The  expressive  nature  of  language  makes  us 
believe that a speech act is sincere. And (iv) the communicative nature of 
language enables us to ensure that a speech act is intelligible. In cases of 
systematically distorted communication, however, the presuppositions of 
ordinary  speech  are  violated.  We  are  not  aware  of  the  violation  of 
communicative  presuppositions  (i)  when we consider  something to  be 
true even if it is actually false, (ii) when we assume that we obey specific 
social norms although we are in fact undermining them, (iii) when we 
deceive ourselves – consciously or unconsciously – about the truthfulness 
of our utterances, or (iv) when we express ourselves incomprehensibly 
but do not notice that we are doing so.  
In all four cases, actors are at the same time protagonists and victims 
of  communicative  deception.  The  power  of  distorted  communication 
derives from its  capacity  to  deceive the deceivers  themselves.  Indeed, 
there is no stronger form of deception than self-deception. Every subject  
capable of speech and action is not only a subject capable of speech and 
51 Ibid.
52 Fultner, ‘Translator's Introduction’, p. xxi.
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reflection but also a subject capable of speech and deception. If we were 
unable to violate the presuppositions of ordinary speech acts, it would be 
pointless to explore the sociological value of functional, as opposed to 
dysfunctional,  communication  processes.  Empowering  forms  of 
intelligibility are a  sine qua non for empowering forms of society.  To 
regard  the  critique  of  systematically  distorted  communication  as  a 
critique of systematically distorted socialisation means to appreciate the 
significance  of  understanding-oriented  forms  of  agency  for  the  very 
possibility  of  a  responsibly  regulated  society.  Just  as  we  cannot  do 
without mutual understanding, we cannot do without at least a minimal 
degree of truth, rightness, sincerity, and intelligibility. To acknowledge 
the parasitic status of systematically distorted communication means to 
recognise  that  human interactions  based  on  deception  cannot  generate 
sustainable forms of social organisation.
Conclusion
(I) If critical theory is truly committed to the transformation of society, it 
needs to provide a normative framework able to distinguish between the 
emancipatory and the repressive potentials of human reality. As a species 
capable  of  emancipation,  we  are  able  to  create  both  individual  and 
collective forms of empowerment. As a species capable of domination, 
we  are  able  to  generate  both  individual  and  collective  forms  of 
disempowerment.  To  be  sure,  it  is  far  from  clear  what  the  species-
constitutive  features  of  humanity  are;  it  is clear,  however,  that  their 
significance for the construction of social existence needs to be explored 
if  we  aim  to  understand  the  unique  resources  of  the  human  world. 
Inasmuch as the realisation of our species-specific potentials is a source 
of self-actualisation, the repression of these potentials is a source of self-
alienation.
(II)  From  a  Habermasian  point  of  view,  the  constitution  of  power 
relations  is  inextricably  linked  to  the  constitution  of  communicative 
relations. The more a given society succeeds in enhancing its members’ 
deliberative power, the more it contributes to the creation of autonomous 
social relations. The more a given society is shaped by its systemic power, 
the  more  it  is  characterised  by  the  creation  of  heteronomous  social 
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relations. According to the Habermasian architecture of the social, then, 
the communicative nature of the lifeworld is diametrically opposed to the 
instrumental  nature  of  the  system:  whereas  the  former  allows  for  the 
normative  regulation  of  society  based  on  subjects’  communicative 
autonomy, the latter leads to the gradual colonisation of society resulting 
in subjects’ structural heteronomy. Insofar as the lifeworld permits us to 
engage in the quotidian exercise of  communicative action and thereby 
develop  a  sense  of  locality,  solidarity,  and  identity,  it  constitutes  the 
cornerstone of social emancipation. Insofar as the system compels us to 
function in accordance with the colonising principle of instrumentality, it 
represents a major source of social domination.
(III)  Knowledge  and  human  interests  cannot  be  separated  from  one 
another because they depend on one another: just as the production of 
knowledge  is  necessarily  interest-laden,  human  interests  are  pursued 
through the construction of knowledge. Our technical cognitive interest in 
controllability, our practical cognitive interest in  comprehensibility, and 
our emancipatory cognitive interest in criticisability are indicative of our 
existential  interest  in  the  collective  construction  of  humanity.  Our 
technical  orientation  towards  instrumentality  permits  us  to  preserve 
ourselves  as  a  purposive species,  our  practical  orientation  towards 
intersubjectivity  allows us  to  coordinate  our  lives  as  a  communicative 
species, and our emancipatory orientation towards reflexivity equips us 
with  the  capacity  to  liberate  ourselves  as  a  contemplative species.  As 
controlling  entities,  we  act  upon the  world  (Weltbearbeitung);  as 
comprehending entities, we act with the world (Weltverarbeitung); and, as 
critical entities, we act  beyond the world (Welterarbeitung). Our will to 
control, comprehend, and critique the world cannot be divorced from our 
will to reason: we have developed the  teleological capacity to act upon 
the world by virtue of  purposive reason;  we have acquired the  social 
capacity to act with the world by virtue of communicative reason; and we 
have obtained the critical capacity to act beyond the world by virtue of 
reflective reason.
(IV) In order to do justice to the self-constitutive nature of the human 
species, we need to shed light on the anthropological specificity of the 
human subject. Every entity capable of speech and action is at the same 
time a (i) transcendental, (ii) cultural, (iii) cognitional, (iv) moral, and (v) 
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dialogical subject. (i) As a transcendental subject, the human species can 
mobilise its self-formative potentials in order to transform the conditions 
of its worldly immanence. (ii) As a  cultural subject, the human species 
can create a social world beyond the natural world, thereby immersing 
itself  in the distinctiveness of its own existence.  (iii)  As a  cognitional 
subject,  the  human  species  can  exploit  the  empowering  resources  of 
work,  language,  and power to  embrace the purposive,  communicative, 
and reflective conditions of its own universe. (iv) As a moral subject, the 
human  species  can  convert  its  own  existence  into  an  object  of 
contemplation and develop a sense of autonomy and responsibility. (v) As 
a  dialogical subject,  the  human  species  can  use  the  power  of 
linguisticality  to construct  spheres of  sociality based on the normative 
force of mutual intelligibility. In short, a species capable of self-formation 
is a species capable of self-emancipation.
(V) An emancipatory theory of the human subject needs to identify the 
emancipatory  resources  of  society  in  order  to  account  for  the 
emancipatory potentials of humanity. From Habermas’s communication-
theoretic  perspective,  the  main  emancipatory  resource  of  society  is 
communicative  action,  that  is,  our  rational  capacity  to  reach  mutual 
understanding.  As  a  species  capable  of  speech  and  action,  we  have 
developed  our  Verstand (reason)  through  the  coexistential  exercise  of 
Verständigung (communication), which is – at least in principle – always 
oriented  towards  Einverständnis (agreement).  Given  our  existential 
orientation towards understanding and consensus, the formal qualities of 
the  ideal  speech  situation  are  anticipated  by  the  presuppositions  of 
ordinary  linguistic  communication:  only  by  making  an  –  implicit  or 
explicit – effort to understand one another can we succeed in constructing 
a coexistential situation which permits us to live with one another. Put 
differently, the communicational and consensual nature of linguisticality 
emanates from the coexistential condition of society. In essence, the ideal 
speech situation constitutes a real speech situation as it forms – always 
and  unavoidably  –  part  of  ordinary  communicative  encounters.  The 
emancipatory  nature  of  ideal  speech  manifests  itself  in  five  levels  of 
power.  (1)  Its  discursive power  enables  the  subjects  to  determine  the 
constitution and evolution of society by virtue of critical reasoning. (2) Its 
anticipatory power is reflected in the fact that even in the most repressive 
forms  of  society,  which  produce  systematically  distorted  forms  of 
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communication,  the  emancipatory  potential  of  communicative  action 
continues to exist, for no society can possibly do without a minimum of 
linguistic intelligibility. (3) Its  ordinary power is due to the fact that, in 
principle, every subject capable of speech and action – regardless of its 
social  authority  and  linguistic  legitimacy  –  can  participate  in  the 
collective  realisation  of  consensual  deliberation.  (4)  Its  foundational 
power  implies  that  there  are  no  emancipatory  forms  of  socialisation 
without  emancipatory  forms  of  communication,  since  empowering 
frameworks of human coexistence depend on communicative processes 
of  mutual  agreement.  (5)  Its  normative power  suggests  that  the 
disempowering situation of social domination can be measured against 
the empowering condition of ideal communication.
(VI) An emancipatory theory of the human subject needs to uncover the 
repressive resources of society if it seeks to account for the repressive 
potentials of humanity. Whilst, according to Habermas, communicative 
action  is  the  key  emancipatory  resource  of  society,  the  distortion  of 
communicative processes is  a crucial  indicator  of  the establishment of 
human relations which undermine, or even obstruct, the unfolding of the 
empowering potentials inherent in action oriented towards reaching an 
understanding. Although, as a species capable of speech and action, we 
have developed our  Verstand (reason) through the coexistential exercise 
of  Verständigung (communication),  our  linguistic  interactions  are  not 
always oriented towards  Verständnis  (understanding) or  Wahrhaftigkeit  
(truthfulness)  but  can  also  be  aimed  at  Mißverständnis  
(misunderstanding) or  Täuschung (deceptiveness). The deceptive nature 
of systematically distorted communication is reflected in its multifaceted 
power.  (1)  Its  distortive power  stems  from our  capacity  to  shape  the 
development of society in accordance with concealed strategic motives 
and  perpetuated  systemic  imperatives.  (2)  Its  reproductive power 
confirms  the  suspicion  that  the  more  we engage in  the  production  of 
systematically distorted communication,  the more we contribute to the 
reproduction  of  social  domination.  (3)  Its  performative  power 
demonstrates  that  every  subject  capable  of  speech  and  action  is  also 
capable of speech and deception and, therefore, able to generate distortive 
forms of communication. (4) Its parasitic power is due to its ontological 
dependence  on  non-distortive – i.e.  understanding-oriented – forms of 
social action, for the coordinative force of communicative action always 
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remains preponderant over the corrosive force of systematic distortion. 
(5)  Its  normative power obliges us to explore the damaging effects of 
deceptive communication and the pathological consequences of systemic 
colonisation.
(VII)  Whereas  Habermas’s  belief  in  the  necessity  and  possibility  of 
human emancipation  is  epitomised  in  the  concept  of  the  ideal  speech 
situation, his analysis of human domination cannot be dissociated from 
the  concept  of  systematically  distorted  communication.  The  former  is 
founded on the understanding-oriented force of  communicative action; 
the  latter,  by  contrast,  is  symptomatic  of  the  utility-driven  force  of 
strategic action. To be sure, it is not open but concealed strategic action 
which  lies  at  the  heart  of  systematically  distorted  communication. 
Deception  is  a  constitutive  component  of  distortive  forms  of 
intelligibility, just as domination is a central element of repressive forms 
of society. Whenever one of the fundamental validity claims inherent in 
linguistic  communication  is  surreptitiously  violated  without  an 
interruption  in  communication  or  a  transition  to  overtly  pronounced 
strategic action, the internal organisation of speech is disrupted and the 
external  relation  between  speakers  is  distorted.  In  other  words,  if  the 
validity  basis  of  speech  is  secretly  curtailed,  systematically  organised 
communication is replaced by systematically distorted communication. A 
communication-theoretic  account  of  the  social  which  claims  to  be 
realistic, rather than idealistic, needs to recognise that subjects capable of 
speech and action are not only subjects capable of speech and reflection 
but also subjects capable of speech and deception. Just as our speech acts 
can be oriented towards truth, rightness, truthfulness, and understanding, 
they can be oriented towards falsehood, inappropriateness, deceitfulness, 
and misunderstanding.
The  sociological  power  of  communicative  action  is  due  to  subjects’ 
coordinative capacity, which allows for the possibility of a consensually 
regulated society. The sociological power of concealed strategic action is 
due to subjects’ deceptive capacity, which allows for the possibility of a 
distortedly steered society. A realistic, rather than idealistic or fatalistic, 
theory  of  the  social  needs  to  account  for  both  the  binding  force  of 
communicative  action  and the  misleading  force  of  concealed  strategic 
action if it seeks to understand not only the coordinative and constructive, 
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but also the deceptive and destructive potentials of the social. Every time 
we engage in communicative action we presuppose the possibility of an 
ideal  speech  situation,  which  is  indicative  of  the  emancipatory  power 
intrinsic to mutual understanding and genuine agreement; and every time 
we engage in concealed strategic action we reinforce the possibility of 
systematically  distorted  communication,  which  is  symptomatic  of  the 
repressive power inherent in deception and delusion.
Given the discursive power of ideal speech, we are able to discuss and 
weigh  up  our  thoughts  and  motives;  given  the  deceptive power  of 
distorted speech, we are able to conceal them. Due to the  anticipatory 
power  of  ideal  speech,  emancipatory  life  forms  are  always  already 
present in communicative speech acts; due to the reproductive power of 
distortive speech,  repressive life forms are unavoidably perpetuated by 
deceptive speech acts. Drawing on the  ordinary power of ideal speech, 
we can rely on the quotidian ubiquity of mutual comprehension; drawing 
on the performative power of distortive speech, we need to face up to the 
mundane  frequency  of  mutual  deception.  In  light  of  the  foundational 
power of ideal speech, we need to recognise that emancipatory forms of 
socialisation presuppose emancipatory forms of communication; in light 
of the parasitic power of distortive speech, we need to acknowledge that 
the  corrosive  force  of  systematic  distortion  is  parasitic  upon  the 
coordinative  force  of  communicative  action.  The  normative power  of 
ideal speech enables us to appreciate the empowering nature of truthful 
deliberation;  the  normative power  of  distortive  speech,  by  contrast, 
compels us to uncover the damaging effects of deceptive communication. 
In short, we need to account for both the emancipatory and the repressive 
potentials of language if we seek to understand both the empowering and 
the disempowering potentials of the communicative subject.
